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Abstract—In the last few years, several techniques for facial
manipulation in videos have been successfully developed and
made available to the masses (i.e., FaceSwap, deepfake, etc.).
These methods enable anyone to easily edit faces in video
sequences with incredibly realistic results and a very little effort.
Despite the usefulness of these tools in many fields, if used
maliciously, they can have a significantly bad impact on society
(e.g., fake news spreading, cyber bullying through fake revenge
porn). The ability of objectively detecting whether a face has
been manipulated in a video sequence is then a task of utmost
importance.
In this paper, we tackle the problem of face manipulation de-
tection in video sequences targeting modern facial manipulation
techniques. In particular, we study the ensembling of different
trained Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) models. In the
proposed solution, different models are obtained starting from a
base network (i.e., EfficientNetB4) making use of two different
concepts: (i) attention layers; (ii) siamese training. We show that
combining these networks leads to promising face manipulation
detection results on two publicly available datasets with more
than 119000 videos.
Index Terms—deepfake, video forensics, deep learning, atten-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, huge steps forward in the field
of automatic video editing techniques have been made. In
particular, great interest has been shown towards methods
for facial manipulation [1]. Just to name an example, it is
nowadays possible to easily perform facial reenactment, i.e.,
transferring the facial expressions from one video to another
one [2], [3]. This enables to change the identity of a speaker
with very little effort.
Systems and tools for facial manipulations are now so
advanced that even users without any previous experience in
photo retouching and digital arts can use them. Indeed, code
and libraries that work in an almost automatic fashion are more
and more often made available to the public for free [4], [5].
On one hand, this technological advancement opens the door
to new artistic possibilities (e.g., movie making, visual effect,
visual arts, etc.). On the other hand, unfortunately, it also eases
the generation of video forgeries by malicious users.
Fake news spreading and revenge porn are just a few of
the possible malicious applications of advanced facial manip-
ulation technology in the wrong hands. As the distribution of
these kinds of manipulated videos indubitably leads to serious
and dangerous consequences (e.g., diminished trust in media,
targeted opinion formation, cyber bullying, etc.), the ability
of detecting whether a face has been manipulated in a video
sequence is becoming of paramount importance [6].
Detecting whether a video has been modified is not a
novel issue per se. Multimedia forensics researchers have been
working on this topic since many years, proposing different
kinds of solutions to different problems [7]–[9]. For instance,
in [10], [11] the authors focus on studying the coding history
of videos. The authors of [12], [13] focus on localizing
copy-move forgeries with block-based or dense techniques.
In [14], [15], different methods are proposed to detect frame
duplication or deletion.
All the above-mentioned methods work according to a
common principle: each non-reversible operation leaves a
peculiar footprint that can be exposed to detect the specific
editing. However, forensics footprints are often very subtle
and hard to detect. This is the case of videos undergoing
excessive compression, multiple editing operations at once, or
strong downsampling [8]. This is also the case of very realistic
forgeries operated through methods that are hard to formally
model. For this reason, modern facial manipulation techniques
are very challenging to detect from the forensic perspective
[16]. As a matter of fact, many different face manipulation
techniques exist (i.e., there is not a unique model explaining
these forgeries). Moreover, they often operate on small video
regions only (i.e., the face or part of it, and not the full frame).
Finally, these kinds of manipulated videos are typically shared
through social platforms that apply resizing as well as coding
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Fig. 1. Sample faces extracted from FF++ and DFDC datasets. For each pristine face, we show a corresponding fake sample generated from it.
steps, further hindering classic forensic detectors performance.
In this paper, we tackle the problem of detecting facial
manipulation operated through modern solutions. In particular,
we focus on all the manipulation techniques reported in [17]
(i.e., deepfakes, Face2Face, FaceSwap and NeuralTextures)
and in the Facebook DFDC started on Kaggle in December
2019 [18]. Within this context, we study the possibility of
using an ensemble of different CNN trained models. We
consider EfficientNetB4 [19] and propose a modified version
of it obtained by adding an attention mechanism [20]. More-
over, for each network, we investigate two different training
strategies, one of which is based on the siamese paradigm.
As one of the big challenges is to be able to run a forensic
detector in real-world scenarios, we develop our solution
keeping computational complexity at bay. Specifically, we
consider the strong hardware and time constraints imposed by
the DFDC [18]. This means that the proposed solution must
be able to analyze 4 000 videos in less than 9 hours using
at most a single NVIDIA P100 GPU. Moreover, the trained
models must occupy less than 1GB of disk space.
Evaluation is performed on two disjoint datasets: FF++ [17],
which has been recently proposed as a public benchmark;
DFDC [18], which has been released as part of the DFDC
Kaggle competition. Fig. 1 depicts a few examples of faces
extracted from the two datasets, reporting pristine and ma-
nipulated samples. Results show that the proposed attention-
based modification as well as the siamese training strategy help
the ensemble system in outperforming the baseline reported
in FF++ on both datasets. Moreover, the proposed attention-
based solution provides interesting insights on which part of
each frame drives face manipulation detection, thus enabling
a small step forward towards the explainability of the network
results.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
reports a literature review of the latest related work. Section III
reports all the details about the proposed method. Section IV
details the experimental setup. Section V collects all the
achieved results. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Multiple video forensics techniques have been proposed for
a variety of tasks in the last few years [7]–[9]. However,
since the forensics community has become aware of the po-
tential social risks introduced by the latest facial manipulation
techniques, many detection algorithms have been proposed to
detect this kind of forgeries [16].
Some of the proposed techniques focus on a CNN-based
frame-by-frame analysis. For instance, MesoNet is proposed
in [21]. This is a relatively shallow CNN with the goal of
detecting fake faces. The authors of [17] have shown that this
network is outperformed by XceptionNet retrained on purpose.
Alternative techniques exploit also the temporal evolution
of video frames through Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
analysis. This is the case of [22] and [23], which first extract
a series of frame-based features, and then put them together
with a recurrent mechanism.
Other methods leverage specific processing traces. This
is the case of [24], where the authors exploit the fact that
deepfake donor faces are warped in order to realistically stick
to the host video. They therefore propose a detector that
captures warping traces.
In order to overcome the limitation of pixel analysis, other
techniques are based on a semantic analysis of the frames. In
[25], a technique that learns to distinguish natural and fake
head pose is proposed. Conversely, the authors of [26] focus
on inconsistent lighting effects. Alternatively, [27] reports a
methodology based on eye blinking analysis. Indeed, the first
generation of deepfake videos was showing some eye artifacts
that could be captured with this method. Unfortunately, the
more the manipulation techniques produce realistic results, the
less semantic methods work.
Finally, other techniques provide additional localization
information. The authors of [28] propose a multi-task learning
method that provides a detection score together with a segmen-
tation mask. Alternatively, in [29], an attention mechanism is
proposed.
Inspired by the state of the art, in this paper we focus
on network ensembles, proposing a solution that works on
multiple datasets and is sufficiently lightweight according to
DFDC competition rules [18].
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we describe our proposed method for video
face manipulation detection, i.e., given a video frame, to detect
whether faces are real (pristine) or fake.
The proposed method is based on the concept of ensem-
bling. Indeed, it is well-known that model ensembling may
lead to better prediction performance. We therefore focus on
investigating whether and how it is possible to train different
CNN-based classifiers to capture different high-level semantic
information that complement one another, thus positively
contributing to the ensemble for this specific problem.
To do so, we consider as starting point the EfficientNet
family of models, proposed in [19] as a novel approach
for the automatic scaling of CNNs. This set of architectures
achieves better accuracy and efficiency with respect to other
state-of-the-art CNNs, and actually revealed to be very useful
to fulfil hardware and time constraints imposed by DFDC.
Given an EfficientNet architecture, we propose to follow two
paths to make the model beneficial for the ensambling. On
one hand, we propose to include an attention mechanism,
which also provides the analyst with a method to infer which
portion of the investigated video is more informative for the
classification process. On the other hand, we investigate how
siamese training strategies can be included into the learning
process for extrapolating additional information about the data.
In the following, more details are provided about Efficient-
Net architecture with the proposed attention mechanism and
the network training strategies.
A. EfficientNet and attention mechanism
Among the family of EfficientNet models, we choose the
EfficientNetB4 as the baseline for our work, motivated by
the good trade-off offered by this architecture in terms of
dimensions (i.e., number of parameters), run time (i.e., FLOPS
cost) and classification performance. As reported in [19], with
19 millions of parameters and 4.2 billions of FLOPS, Effi-
cientNetB4 reaches the 83.8% top-1 accuracy on the ImageNet
[30] dataset. On the same dataset, XceptionNet, used as face
manipulation detection baseline method by the authors of [17],
reaches the 79% top-1 accuracy at the expense of 23 millions
parameters and 8.4 billions FLOPS.
EfficientNetB4 architecture is represented within the blue
block in Fig. 2, where all layers are defined using the same
nomenclature introduced in [19].
The input to the network is a squared color image I, i.e.,
in our experiments, the face extracted from a video frame.
As a matter of fact, authors of [17] recommend to track face
information instead of using the full frame as input to the
network for increasing the classification accuracy. Moreover,
faces can be easily extracted from frames using any of the
widely available face detectors proposed in the literature [31],
[32]. The network output is a feature vector of 1792 elements,
defined as f(I). The final score related to the face is the result
of a classification layer.
The proposed variant of the standard EfficientNetB4 archi-
tecture is inspired by the several contributions in the natural
language processing and computer vision fields that make
use of attention mechanisms. Works such as the transformer
[20] and residual attention networks [33] show how it is
possible for a neural network to learn which part of its input
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Fig. 2. Blue block: EfficientNetB4 model. If the red block is embedded into
the network, an attention mechanism is included in the model, defining the
proposed EfficientNetB4Att architecture.
(being an image or a sequence of words) is more relevant
for accomplishing the task at hand. In the context of video
deepfake detection, it would be of great benefit to discover
which portion of the input gave the network more information
for its decision making process. We thus explicitly implement
an attention mechanism similar to the one already exploited
by the EfficientNet itself, as well as to the self-attention
mechanisms presented in [29], [34]:
1) we select the feature maps extracted by the Efficient-
NetB4 up to a certain layer, chosen such that these
features provide sufficient information on the input
frame without being too detailed or, on the contrary, too
unrefined. To this purpose, we select the output features
at the third MBConv block which have size 28×28×56;
2) we process the feature maps with a single convolutional
layer with kernel size 1 followed by a Sigmoid activation
function to obtain a single attention map;
3) we multiply the attention map for each of the feature
maps at the selected layer.
For clarity’s sake, the attention-based module is depicted in
the red block of Fig. 2.
On one hand, this simple mechanism enables the network to
focus only on the most relevant portions of the feature maps,
on the other hand it provides us with a deeper insight on
which parts of the input the network assumes as the most
informative. Indeed, the obtained attention map can be easily
mapped to the input sample, highlighting which elements of it
have been given more importance by the network. The result
of the attention block is finally processed by the remaining
layers of EfficientNetB4. The whole training procedure can
be executed end-to-end, and we call the resulting network
EfficientNetB4Att.
B. Network training
We train each model according to two different training
paradigms: (i) end-to-end, and; (ii) siamese. The former repre-
sents a more classical training strategy, also used as evaluation
metrics in the contest of DFDC. The latter aims at exploiting
the generalization capabilities offered by the networks in order
to obtain a feature descriptor that privileges the similarity
between samples belonging to the same class. The ultimate
goal is to learn a representation in the encoding space of the
network’s layers that well separates samples (i.e., faces) of the
real and fake class.
1) End-to-end training: We feed the network with a sample
face, and the network returns a face-related score yˆ. Notice that
this score is not passed through a Sigmoid activation function
yet. The weights update is led by the commonly used LogLoss
function
LL = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
[yi log (S(yˆi)) + (1− yi) log (1− S(yˆi))] ,
(1)
where yˆi represents the i-th face score, yi ∈ {0, 1} the related
face label. Specifically, label 0 is associated with faces coming
from real pristine videos and label 1 with fake videos. N is
the total number of faces used for training and S (·) is the
Sigmoid function.
2) Siamese training: Inspired by computer vision works
that generate local feature descriptors using CNNs, we adopt
the triplet margin loss, first proposed in [35]. Recalling that
f(I) is the non-linear encoding obtained by the network for
an input face I (see Fig. 2), being ‖·‖2 the L2 norm, the triplet
margin loss is defined as
LT = max(0, µ+ δ+ − δ−), (2)
with δ+ = ‖f(Ia) − f(Ip)‖2, δ− = ‖f(Ia) − f(In)‖2 and µ
is a strictly positive margin. In this case Ia, Ip and In are,
respectively:
• Ia the anchor sample (i.e., a real face);
• Ip a positive sample, belonging to the same class as Ia
(i.e., another real face);
• In a negative sample, belonging to a different class than
Ia (i.e., a fake face).
We then finalize the training by finetuning a simple classi-
fication layer on top of the network, following the end-to-end
approach described before.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section we report all the details regarding the used
datasets and experimental setup.
A. Dataset
We test the proposed method on two different datasets:
FF++ [17]; DFDC [18].
FF++ is a large-scale facial manipulation dataset generated
using automated state-of-the-art video editing methods. In
detail, two classical computer graphics approaches are used,
i.e., Face2Face [2] and FaceSwap [5], together with two
learning-based strategies, i.e., DeepFakes [4] and NeuralTex-
tures [3]. Every method is applied to 1000 high quality pris-
tine videos downloaded from YouTube, manually selected to
present nearly front-facing subjects without occlusions. All the
sequences contain at least 280 frames. Eventually, a database
of more than 1.8 million images from 4000 manipulated videos
is built. In order to simulate a realistic setting, videos are
compressed using the H.264 codec. High quality as well as low
quality videos are generated using a constant rate quantization
parameter equal to 23 and 40, respectively.
DFDC is the training dataset released for the homologous
Kaggle challenge. It is composed by more than 119 000 video
sequences, created specifically for this challenge, representing
both real and fake videos. The real videos are sequences of ac-
tors taking into account diversity in several axes (gender, skin-
tone, age, etc.) recorded with arbitrary backgrounds to bring
visual variability. The fake videos are created starting from the
real ones and applying different DeepFake techniques, e.g.,
different face swap algorithms. Notice that we do not know
the precise algorithms used to generate fake videos, since for
the time being the complete dataset (i.e., with the public and
private testing sequences and possibly an explanation of the
creation procedure) has not been released yet. The sequence
length is roughly 300 frames, and the classes are strongly
unbalanced towards the fake one, counting roughly 100 000
fakes and 19 000 reals.
B. Networks
In our experiments, we consider the following networks:
• XceptionNet, since it is the best performing model used in
[17], thus being the natural yardstick for our experimental
campaign;
• EfficentNetB4, as it achieves better accuracy and effi-
ciency than other existing methods [19];
• EfficentNetB4Att, which should discriminate relevant
parts of the face sample from irrelevant ones.
Each model is trained and tested separately over both the
considered datasets. Specifically, regarding FF++, we consider
only videos generated with constant rate quantization equal to
23. XceptionNet is trained using the same approach of [17],
whereas the two EfficientNet models are trained following the
end-to-end as well as the siamese fashion described in Sec-
tion III-B. In doing so, we end up with 4 trained models: Effi-
cientNetB4 and EfficientNetB4Att which are trained with the
classical end-to-end approach, together with EfficientNetB4ST
and EfficientNetB4AttST, trained using the siamese strategy.
All these EfficientNetB4-derived models can contribute to the
final ensembling.
C. Setup
We adopt a different split policy for each dataset. We split
DFDC according to its folder structure, using the first 35
folders for training, folders from 36 to 40 for validation and
the last 10 folders for testing. Regarding FF++, we use a
similar split as in [17] selecting 720 videos for training, 140 for
validation and 140 for test from the pool of original sequences
taken from YouTube. The corresponding fake videos are
assigned to the same split. All the results are shown on the
test sets.
In our experiments, we only consider a limited number
of frames for each video. In training phase, this choice is
motivated by two main considerations: (i) when using a really
small amount of frames per video, there is a strong tendency to
overfit; (ii) increasing the number of frames does not improve
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Fig. 3. Training and validation loss curves for XceptionNet on FF++, while
varying the number of frames per video (FPV).
performances in a justifiable manner. This phenomenon can be
noticed in Fig. 3, which reports training and validation losses
as a function of training iterations, selecting a variable amount
of frames per video. It is worth noting that the minimum
validation loss does not improve selecting 15 frames per video
instead of 32, however choosing 32 frames per video helps
to prevent overfitting. For testing, we should also take into
account the hardware and time constraints imposed by the
DFDC challenge. With this in mind, we limit the number of
analyzed frames from each sequence to 32 for both training
and testing phases. Even in this setting, the dimensions of the
datasets remain remarkable: for the FF++, we end up with
roughly 1.6 million images, while for the DFDC with 3.4
million frames.
In this perspective, we can further reduce the amount of
data processed by the networks by recalling that not all the
frame information is useful for the deepfake detection process
[17]. Indeed, we can mainly focus our analysis on the region
where the face of the subject is located. Consequently, as a
pre-processing step, we extract from each frame the faces of
the scene subjects using the BlazeFace extractor [32], that, in
our experiments, proved to be faster than the MTCNN detector
[31] used by the authors of [17]. In case more than one face is
detected, we keep the face with the best confidence score. The
resulting input for the networks is the squared color image I
introduced in section III, of size 224× 224 pixel.
During training and validation, to make our models more
robust, we perform data augmentation operations on the input
faces. In particular, we randomly apply downscaling, horizon-
tal flipping, random brightness contrast, hue saturation, noise
addition and finally JPEG compression. Specifically, we resort
to Albumentation [36] as our data-augmentation library, while
we use Pytorch [37] as Deep Learning framework. We train
the models using Adam [38] optimizer with hyperparameters
equal to β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999,  = 10−8, and initial learning
rate equal to 10−5.
Independently from the used training strategy, given the size
of the datasets, we never train our networks for a complete
epoch. Specifically:
• for the end-to-end training, we either train for a maximum
of 20k iterations, indicating as iteration the processing of
a batch of 32 faces (16 real, 16 fake) taken randomly
and evenly across all the videos of the train split, or
until reaching a plateau on the validation loss. Validation
of the model in this context is performed every 500
training iterations, on 6000 samples taken again evenly
and randomly across all videos of the validation set.
The initial learning rate is reduced of a 0.1 factor if
the validation loss does not decrease after 10 validation
routines (5000 training iterations), and the training is
stopped when we reach a minimum learning rate of
1× 10−10;
• for the siamese training, the feature extractor is trained
using the same number of iterations, validation routine
and learning rate scheduling of the end-to-end training.
The main difference lies in the different loss function
used (as explained in Section III), and in the composition
of the batch, which in this case is made by 12 triplets
of samples (6 real-fake-fake, 6 fake-fake-real) selected
across all videos of the set considered. Regarding the
parameter µ in (2), we set it to 1 after some preliminary
experiments. The fine-tuning of the classification layer is
then executed in a successive step following the end-to-
end training paradigm with the hyperparameters specified
above.
We finally run our experiments on a machine equipped with
an Intel Xeon E5-2687W-v4 and a NVIDIA Titan V. The code
to replicate our tests is freely available at https://github.com/
polimi-ispl/icpr2020dfdc.
V. RESULTS
In this section we collect all the results obtained during our
experimental campaign.
A. EfficientNetB4Att explainability
In order to show the effectiveness of the attention mecha-
nism in extracting the most informative content of faces, we
evaluate the attention map computed on a few faces of FF++.
Referring to Fig. 2, we select the output of the Sigmoid layer
in the attention block, which is a 2D map with size 28× 28.
Then, we up-scale it to the input face size (224 × 224), and
superimpose this to the input face. Results are reported in
Fig. 4. It is worth noting that this simple attention mechanism
enables to highlight the most detailed portion of faces, e.g.,
eyes, mouth, nose and ears. On the contrary, flat regions (where
gradients are small) are not informative for the network. As a
matter of fact, it has been shown several times that artifacts
of deepfake generation methods are mostly localized around
facial features [16]. For instance, roughly modeled eyes and
teeth, showing excessively white regions, are still the main
trademarks of these methods.
Fig. 4. Effect of the attention on faces under analysis. Given some faces to analyze (top row), the attention network tends to select regions like eyes, mouth
and nose (bottom row). Faces have been extracted from FF++ dataset.
B. Siamese features
In order to understand whether the features produced by
the encoding of the network when trained in siamese fashion
are discriminatory for the task, we computed a projection
over a reduced space using the well known algorithm t-
SNE [39]. In Fig. 5 we show the projection obtained by means
of EfficientNetB4Att starting from 20 FF++ videos. We can
clearly see how frames of the same videos clusters into small
sub-regions. More importantly, all the real samples cluster into
the top region of the chart, whereas the fake samples are in
the bottom region. Frames of the same videos clusters into
smaller sub-regions. This justifies the choice to adopt this
particular training paradigm in addition to the classical end-
to-end approach.
C. Architecture independence
As we want to understand whether the different networks
can be used in an ensemble, we explore whether the scores
extracted by each model are independent to some extent.
In Fig. 6, all plots outside of the main diagonal show that
different networks provide slightly different scores for each
frame. Indeed, the point clouds do not perfectly align on
a shape that can be easily described by a simple relation.
This motivates us in using the different trained models in an
ensemble way. If all networks were perfectly correlated, this
would not be reasonable.
D. Face manipulation detection capability
In this section, we report the average results achieved by the
baseline network (i.e., XceptionNet) and the 4 proposed mod-
els (i.e., EfficientNetB4, EfficientNetB4Att, EfficientNetB4ST
and EfficientNetB4AttST). We also verify our guess behind the
use of an ensemble, specifically combining two, three or even
all the proposed models. In this case, the final score associated
with a face is simply computed as the average between the
scores returned by the single models.
In Table I we report the AUC (computed binarizing the
network output with different thresholds) and LogLoss ob-
tained in our experiments. Results are provided in a per-frame
fashion.
Fig. 5. t-SNE visualization of features obtained by EfficientNetB4Att with
siamese training. Faces have been extracted from FF++ dataset.
Analyzing these results, it is worth noting that the strategy
of model ensembling generally awards in terms of perfor-
mances. As somehow expected, best top-3 results are always
reached by a combination of 2 or more networks, meaning
that network fusion helps both the accuracy of the deepfake
detection (estimated by means of AUC) and the quality of the
detection (estimated by means of LogLoss measure). Indeed,
on both datasets, LogLoss and AUC are always better than the
baseline.
E. Kaggle results
In order to gain a deeper insight on the proposed solution
performance, we also participated to the DFDC challenge
on Kaggle [18] as ISPL team. The ultimate goal of the
competition was to build a system able to tell whether a video
is real or fake. The DFDC dataset used in this paper represents
the training dataset released by the competition host, while the
(a) FF++ (b) DFDC
Fig. 6. Pair-plot showing the score distribution for real (orange •) and fake (blue •) samples for each pair of networks on FF++ (a) and DFDC (b) datasets.
TABLE I
AREA UNDER THE CURVE (AUC) AND LOGLOSS OBTAINED WITH
DIFFERENT NETWORK COMBINATIONS OVER ALL THE DATASETS. TOP-3
RESULTS PER COLUMN IN BOLD, BASELINE IN ITALICS.
Xception EfficientNet AUC LogLoss
Net B4 B4ST B4Att B4AttST FF++ DFDC FF++ DFDC
X 0.9273 0.8784 0.3844 0.4897
X 0.9382 0.8766 0.3777 0.4819
X 0.9337 0.8658 0.3439 0.5075
X 0.9360 0.8642 0.3873 0.5133
X 0.9293 0.8360 0.3597 0.5507
X X 0.9413 0.8800 0.3411 0.4687
X X 0.9428 0.8785 0.3566 0.4731
X X 0.9421 0.8729 0.3370 0.4739
X X 0.9423 0.8760 0.3371 0.4770
X X 0.9393 0.8642 0.3289 0.4977
X X 0.9390 0.8625 0.3515 0.4997
X X X 0.9441 0.8813 0.3371 0.4640
X X X 0.9432 0.8769 0.3269 0.4684
X X X 0.9433 0.8751 0.3399 0.4717
X X X 0.9426 0.8719 0.3304 0.4800
X X X X 0.9444 0.8782 0.3294 0.4658
evaluation is performed over two different testing datasets: (i)
the public test dataset; (ii) the private test dataset. Participants
were not aware of the composition of those datasets (e.g.,
the provenance of the sequences, the techniques used for
generating fakes, etc.), apart from the number of videos in
public test set, which is roughly 4000. The final solution
proposed by our team was an ensemble of the 4 proposed
models, which led us to top 3% on the leaderboard computed
against the public test set. For the time being, the leaderboard
computed over the private test set has not been disclosed yet.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Being able to detect whether a video contains manipulated
content is nowadays of paramount importance, given the
significant impact of videos in everyday life and in mass
communications. In this vein, we tackle the detection of facial
manipulation in video sequences, targeting classical computer
graphics as well as deep learning generated fake videos.
The proposed method takes inspiration from the family of
EfficientNet models and improves upon a recently proposed
solution, investigating an ensemble of models trained using
two main concepts: (i) an attention mechanism which gener-
ates a human comprehensible inference of the model, increas-
ing the learning capability of the network at the same time; (ii)
a triplet siamese training strategy which extracts deep features
from data to achieve better classification performances.
Results evaluated over two publicly available datasets con-
taining almost 120 000 videos reveals the proposed ensemble
strategy as a valid solution for the goal of facial manipulation
detection.
Future work will be devoted to the embedding of temporal
information. As a matter of fact, intelligent voting schemes
when more frames are analyzed at once might lead to an
increased accuracy.
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